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Abstract
A recent trend in the German Asset Backed Securities (ABS) market
is the securitisation of subordinated loans and proﬁt participation agree-
ments (PPAs) granted to medium-sized enterprises (MEs). This paper
provides an overview of this growing market and analyses the beneﬁts of
such transactions for the portfolio companies as well as originators and
potential investors. Simulations of ten recent transactions indicate that
despite of relatively low interest rates charged on obligors, originators and
investors can earn attractive returns at fairly low risk. In particular, the
junior tranches of these securitisations exhibit quite attractive risk-return
proﬁles.
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1In the subprime crisis which started in July 2007 many observers wondered
how a rather limited number of defaults in the US-housing sector could trigger a
worldwide crisis in ﬁnancial markets. Some observers blame the rating agencies
for too optimistic ratings, others put the blame on securitisation transactions
being too complex and too intransparent. Alan Greenspan (2007) predicted that
securitisation would never revive to the large volumes of the years before the
subprime crisis. Given the diﬀerent views about the subprime crisis and the lack
of thorough analyses of the securitisation market, this paper aims to improve the
knowledge about securitisation transactions by analyzing German securitisations
of mezzanine loans. These loans are subordinated and, thus, more risky than
standard loans. Hence securitisations of these loans may encounter strong skepti-
cism in a ﬁnancial market crisis. The main purpose of this paper is an empirical
analysis of the German mezzanine securitisations to portray the beneﬁts and risks
inherent in these transactions. These securitisations do not use commercial paper
for funding, they are funded with long term bonds. Hence they are not exposed
to the funding risks of many structured investment vehicles which strongly con-
tributed to the subprime crisis. The ﬁndings of this paper may help to evaluate
these transactions with respect to ﬁnancial stability.
1 Introduction
Within the European Asset Backed Securities (ABS) Market, securitisations of
bank portfolios of commercial loans (Collateralised Loan Obligations, CLO) saw
strong growth in 2005. The issuance volume in this market segment more than
doubled in 2005 as compared to 2004 (see HSBC Bank plc. 2006 or Deutsche
Bank AG 2006a). This growth was primarily due to high issuance volumes in
SME-related securitisations (26 billion e), which account for approximately 40%
of the CLO sector. Beside of Spain and the Netherlands, Germany is strong
within this sub-sector.
The growth in the German market is also driven by the new trend to securitise
mezzanine loans granted to medium-sized enterprises (MEs). From May 2004 to
July 2006 ten mezzanine securitisations were originated by several large German
banks. Since these transactions are mainly focused on medium-sized companies,
they are also called “Middle Market” securitisations. They emerged as an answer
to serious problems in ME ﬁnancing. Fairly high insolvency rates and thin equity
capitalization of MEs together with high regulatory capital requirements due to
Basel II and strong proﬁtability pressure on banks, had led to a more restric-
tive lending policy (see European Central Bank 2005). Therefore MEs turn to
alternative ﬁnancial instruments, in particular, mezzanine debt.
Mezzanine loans are subordinated to standard debt and senior to equity. De-
pendent on the contractual features, mezzanine loans have the advantage that -
under certain conditions - they account (partially) for equity in the MEs’ balance
2sheets or at least for economic equity capital (“wirtschaftliches Eigenkapital”) in
the rating process. Nevertheless, interest payments are tax deductible. Therefore
MEs, which make use of these ﬁnancial instruments, can enhance their equity
capitalization at comparably low costs, which in turn facilitates the access to
standard loans. Due to the new securitisation structures, in which mezzanine
loans are directly granted by a special purpose vehicle (SPV), MEs get indirect
access to the capital market.
This paper ﬁrst describes German middle market deals and contrasts them
to classical CLO-transactions. Since mezzanine securitisations are fairly new,
former research (e.g. Jobst 2005, GBRW Ltd. 2004) focused on ‘classical’ SME
loan securitisations. Second, this paper provides a simpliﬁed analysis of the port-
folios underlying middle market transactions indicating that they are attractive
to originating banks, investors and medium-sized obligor companies. Third, the
main contribution of this paper is a detailed empirical analysis of the risks of
these securitisations. This analysis uses simulation tools which are also employed
by the rating agencies. Since the simulation results strongly depend on the input
parameters which are controversial, the sensitivity of results with respect to these
parameters plays a major role in the analysis. Therefore we perform several ro-
bustness checks. They reveal that the loss rate distributions of the transactions
are fairly insensitive to the assumed recovery rate, but quite sensitive to the ini-
tial obligor rating. From the investors’ viewpoint, it is more important to analyse
the risks of the bond tranches issued in the securitisation process. The most risky
tranche is the junior note which is eﬀectively a First Loss Position. This note is
at least partly sold to investors. Hence it is essential for investors to understand
the beneﬁts and risks of the junior notes. Therefore we analyse the junior notes
in detail. The simulations show that the junior notes exhibit quite attractive
risk-return proﬁles for investors. Particularly, these notes generate rather high
internal rates of returns with low downside risk. This indicates that originating
banks reward investors generously. This is presumably necessary for selling sub-
stantial parts of the junior notes to other banks which then incur high equity
capital costs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the next section cur-
rent problems to ME ﬁnancing are addressed and some mezzanine claims under-
lying Middle Market transactions are explained. Section 3 characterizes middle
market transactions in Germany and contrasts them to classical SME loan secu-
ritisations. In section 4 the risk-return characteristics of the underlying portfolios
are studied in detail. Section 5 discusses the tranching of the transactions and in
particular the risk-return proﬁles of the junior notes. Section 6 concludes.
32 ME Financing in Germany
2.1 A brief Overview on the Current Situation
Medium-sized enterprises (MEs) can be deﬁned as enterprises which employ be-
tween 50 and 500 people. Although MEs represent only around two percent of all
German SMEs, they employed 50% of all employees in SMEs and realised around
50% of the SMEs’ total investment volume in 2005. Whereas small enterprises re-
duced their investment volume from 2004 to 2005, they increased it.These ﬁgures
illustrate the importance of MEs for the German economy.
MEs in Germany mostly ﬁnance their investment projects from internal funds.
These funds accounted for more than 50% of the total investment volume in 2005.
Although these enterprises increasingly use leasing and trade credits, standard
bank loans accounted for about 20% of the total investment volume in 2005 and
still represent the most important source of external ﬁnancing.1
Until recently, a long-term lending relationship between a ME and its preferred
bank, the so-called Hausbank, stabilized access to debt at fair terms. But the
growing proﬁtability pressure in the banking industry together with diﬀerentiated
capital charges under Basel II and rather high insolvency rates in the ME sector
induced banks to pursue a more restrictive, more risk-return oriented lending
policy in recent years. As noted by KfW Bankengruppe (2006), around 30% of
all loan negotiations failed in 2005. Whereas MEs rejected loan oﬀers mostly
because of high interest rates, banks were not willing to engage in a loan contract
due to insuﬃcient collateral and low credit quality.
German banks rely more and more on internal rating systems in order to assess
the risk of a loan and to charge risk-adjusted interest rates. Because of high risks
and low equity capital it is diﬃcult for MEs to attain an investment grade rating
and attractive loan terms. Low equity ratios are typical for German MEs, driven
by low proﬁtability and the unwillingness of owners to restrain their independence
by sharing ownership with others. According to Deutsche Bundesbank (2007)
more than 25% of all MEs have an equity ratio below 10 percent. The median
equity ratio of around 17 percent is signiﬁcantly lower than the median equity
ratio of large enterprises (24%). The average equity ratio (slightly above 20%)
is also very low as compared to the average equity ratios in other countries like
France (35%), Spain (40%) or the US (45%). Consequently, more than 45%
of MEs aim at increasing their equity ratios during the next years (see KfW
Bankengruppe 2005).
Thinly capitalized, low rated MEs face strong diﬃculties getting standard
bank loans. As a consequence, around 60% of all planned investment projects
were postponed or even abandoned in 2005 due to the lack of capital.2 Raising
1For all these facts see KfW Bankengruppe (2006).
2According to KfW Bankengruppe (2006) the realised investment volume of German MEs
amounted to around 100 billion e in 2005.
4money at the capital market, like issuing shares or corporate bonds, is hardly
possible for most MEs because of their limited size. Also private equity is less
attractive since the owners seek to retain their independence. Therefore MEs are
looking for new ﬁnancing alternatives, making mezzanine debt more and more
attractive.
2.2 Mezzanine Loans
There is a large variety of mezzanine loans. In general, these instruments are
debt instruments which also exhibit some equity characteristics. The loans are
subordinated to standard debt, but senior to equity. Most of the mezzanine
loans are repayable after 5 to 8 years, only very few instruments are perpetu-
als. Due to their subordination, mezzanine loans bear more default risk than
standard loans. Therefore banks charge higher interest rates as compared to se-
nior debt. Examples are subordinated loans and proﬁt participation agreements
(PPA, Genuss-scheine).3
Subordinated loans are typically unsecured claims with a ﬁxed interest
rate. Sometimes they also include a small proﬁt-related interest component to
be paid in addition to the ﬁxed component if certain success triggers are reached.
In this case the instrument can also be seen as a debt-like PPA. Since it neither
allows for interest deferral nor for loss participation, it accounts for debt in the
balance sheet. Nevertheless, a fraction might be recognized as economic equity
capital (“wirtschaftliches Eigenkapital”).
In contrast, interest deferral (e.g. if no proﬁts are reported) is usual in (equity-
like) proﬁt participation agreements. Some PPAs even allow for loss par-
ticipation of the principal. In this case the principal is reduced by losses of the
current period, but may be replenished by proﬁts in the following periods. Hence,
they may account for equity in the ME’s balance sheet according to German ac-
counting rules.4 Nevertheless, the interest payments, which are composed of a
ﬁxed component, interest deferral surcharges and often a proﬁt-related compo-
nent, are tax-deductible.
From the ME’s point of view, mezzanine loans are attractive because the buyer
of these claims has almost no management or control rights. This is important
because most MEs are privately owned and the entrepreneur does not like to share
decision-making power with others. Instead, mezzanine loan ﬁnancing contracts
usually require MEs to provide lenders annual ﬁnancial statements and quarterly
3Further examples are convertible bonds and equity like claims in a typische/atypische stille
Gesellschaft. This paper concentrates on subordinated loans and PPAs as typical instruments
to be securitised.
4According to the German commercial code HGB, capital is classiﬁed as equity if it satisﬁes
the following four conditions: (i) subordination, (ii) long-term capital investment (more than
5 years), (iii) loss participation, (iv) proﬁt related compensation. According to IAS 32, PPAs
do not count as equity due to a ﬁxed maturity.
5Table 1: Overview of ‘Middle Market’ securitisations in Germany
Transaction Date of Volume Number Average Loan Average
issue (million e) of loans Volume Loan
(million e) Rating
PREPS 2004-1 May 2004 249.0 34 7.3 BBB-
PREPS 2004-2 Dec 2004 616.0 67 9.2 BBB-
PREPS 2005-1 Jul 2005 313.0 51 6.1 BBB-
H.E.A.T. I 2005 Aug 2005 220.0 32 6.9 BBB-
PREPS 2005-2 Dec 2005 360.0 62 5.8 BBB-
FORCE 2005-1 Dec 2005 370.5 57 6.5 BBB
CB MezzCAP Apr 2006 199.5 35 5.7 BBB
H.E.A.T. II 2006 Apr 2006 280.0 47 6.0 BB+
StaGe Mezzanine Jun 2006 175.8 51 3.4 BBB
PREPS 2006-1 Jul 2006 321.0 61 5.3 BBB
3,104.8 497
Source: Moody’s New Issue/Pre-Sale Reports, Deutsche Bank AG, JPMorgan
reports. However, if the rating of the ME deteriorates below investment grade,
the buyer of a mezzanine loan might be entitled to interfere in the management
process.
Summarizing, mezzanine loans can help MEs to increase the (economic) equity
ratio at comparably low cost. An improved equity ratio allows the ME to obtain
standard bank loans at better terms. The new securitisation structures, presented
in the next section, stimulate the supply of mezzanine loans which eventually
should lower the interest rates charged.
3 Securitisations of Mezzanine Loans
In 2004 the Capital Eﬃciency Group together with HypoVereinsbank (HVB)
initiated the ﬁrst German securitisation of subordinated loans and proﬁt partici-
pation agreements granted to German MEs (PREPS 2004-1). Several mezzanine
transactions - also by other large German banks - followed during the last two
years, which are all listed in Table 1.5 Up to July 2006, around 500 mezzanine
loans with a total volume of more than 3 billion e were securitised in 10 true-sale
transactions.
In contrast to standard SME loan securitisations, the mezzanine loans are
not granted to MEs by a bank and then transferred to a SPV, but by the SPV
itself as illustrated in Figure 3 in the appendix. Since the SPV is not a bank,
middle market transactions are not arranged to obtain regulatory capital relief as
it is the case for standard SME CLO-securitisations. Instead the main motive for
5There are also some loans of MEs in other European countries (especially Austria, Switzer-
land and Italy) in the PREPS portfolios, but most loans are of German companies.
6Table 2: SME loan securitisations versus ‘Middle Market’ securitisations
Standard SME CLO Middle Market CLO
Motivation regulatory capital relief arbitrage proﬁt
Underlying existing portfolio portfolio of new
of bank loans subordinated loans, PPAs
(large part secured) (unsecured)
No. of claims > 200 30 − 70
Loan Volumes 200,000 to 1.5 million e 1 to 18 million e
Transaction Volume often exceeds 1 billion e 175 to 650 million e
Junior Note Coupon6 no yes
Source: Own presentation based on J.P. Morgan (2006)
the originating bank is to earn an arbitrage proﬁt (see Table 2 for a comparison
between standard SME CLO- and middle market CLO-securitisations). Hence,
these transactions do not transfer the default risk of existing loans, but of newly
granted loans. So far all mezzanine transactions are static, true-sale deals while
standard SME loan securitisations are often synthetic.
Usually, the SPV cooperates with one or more German banks acting as in-
termediaries. Besides, other ﬁnancial experts may be engaged in the process. As
usual, a trustee has to safeguard the interests of investors buying bonds issued by
the SPV. Rating agencies certify the ratings of claims and of issued bonds. Other
ﬁnancial advisors my help in the screening of obligors and in the monitoring of
the transaction. In some transactions, a recovery manager is involved to sell oﬀ
distressed loans or to restructure the obligor companies so as to improve the value
of distressed loans.
The obligors in middle market transactions have to pass a strong screening
process before being selected for the portfolio. They should have an investment
grade rating, generate an annual turnover above 50 million e (see Maier 2006)
and have capital needs of at least 1 million e. In fact, relatively large loan
volumes (1 - 18 million e) are a special feature of mezzanine transactions. Hence,
until now small enterprises do not have access to middle market transactions.
Moreover, as indicated in Table 1, the number of loans in these transactions
is relatively small so that the loan portfolios are not well diversiﬁed making
them more vulnerable to economic downturns. In contrast, securitisations of
SME standard loan portfolios are more granular (often more than 200 loans) and
characterised by small average loan volumes, mostly between 200,000 e and 1.5
million e (see HVB Corporates & Markets 2005). Furthermore, the volume of a
standard SME loan securitisation usually exceeds 1 billion e, much more than
the volume of middle market securitisations.
In a typical middle market transaction the underlying mezzanine loans have
7a seven-year bullet maturity without any call provision of the obligor. In general,
the claims are unsecured. The types of loan instruments diﬀer across mezzanine
transactions. For example, the portfolios underlying the PREPS transactions
consist only of subordinated loans or debt-like PPAs without any loss participa-
tion or interest deferral possibilities. In these transactions obligors pay a ﬁxed
interest coupon plus a stepwise proﬁt dependent component of 1% respectively
2%. For example, Q-Cells AG (2005), one of the portfolio companies in PREPS
2004-2 with a 15 million e obligation, states in its annual report that it pays a
ﬁxed interest of 7.5% as long as the adjusted net income of the same year is less
than 45 million e, 8.5% if it is between 45 and 55 million e and 9.5% if it is
above 55 million e. The transactions H.E.A.T. I and CB MezzCAP comprise a
mixture of subordinated loans (approximately one third) and PPAs. The portfo-
lio in FORCE 2005-1 is mainly composed of PPAs (91%) which allow for interest
deferral and even loss participation. In this transaction the obligors must pay an
additional interest if they do not provide annual statements in time.7
The ﬁxed interest payable in all these transactions ranges between 6.5% and
9.5% depending also on the ME’s rating. The average ﬁxed interest rates of
each transaction are given in Table 3. These rates are far below comparable
interest rates required by mezzanine investment funds (between 13% and 16%,
see Dentz 2006). This cost diﬀerential still remains substantial if the MEs have
to pay proﬁt-related premiums and/or a surcharge for interest deferral. This
diﬀerential is presumably due to some standardisation of contracts which reduces
transaction costs but which also implies less contractual ﬂexibility for the obligors.
Additionally, the securitisation of mezzanine loan portfolios may generate beneﬁts
which also justify lower interest rates.
The SPV obtains the funds for the loans by issuing bonds. These bonds
have the same maturity as the loans. Hence the securitisation is not exposed to
liquidity risks induced by revolving short-term commercial paper funding. Several
tranches of bonds are issued. Usually, these tranches are strictly subordinated,
i.e. a tranche suﬀers from default losses only if all subordinated tranches are
completely exhausted by default losses. The most subordinated tranche, which
ﬁrst absorbs all default losses up to its par value, is the First Loss Position (FLP).
It is non-rated and also called equity tranche or junior tranche. In a typical loan
securitisation transaction the FLP absorbs more than two thirds of the expected
default loss of the underlying loan portfolio (Franke, Herrmann and Weber 2007).
Due to proﬁt-related components in interest rates, interest deferral and loss
participation, the performance of mezzanine portfolios is diﬃcult to forecast.
Therefore, rating agencies require high FLPs for middle market transactions.
They range between 9.9% and 21% - apart from 4.5% in CBMezzCAP. Usually,
6In contrast to standard SME CLOs, the junior note of a middle market CLO receives a
coupon which is explicitly stated in the oﬀering circular.
7Typical instruments used in the FORCE 2005-1 transaction are further explained in ap-
pendix A.
8the FLPs are not retained by the originator, but split between the originating
parties and a third party or even completely sold to third-parties. A full sale of
the FLP may raise investor concerns about moral hazard of the originator. Given
a full sale, the originator bears no default risk. Hence he has little motivation to
monitor the obligors. This may raise the risks in those transactions.
The originating bank beneﬁts from the transaction in various ways. It collects
initial and ongoing fees from the SPV for structuring the transaction, servicing
the loans and managing the SPV. Often it acts as a swap counterparty, thus
it may also extract a swap rent. For example, an interest swap is required to
match the gap between the predominantly ﬁxed interest income from the loans
and the typically ﬂoating interest payments to the tranches. More importantly, if
at the termination of the transaction a surplus remains in the SPV, this surplus
is distributed to the originating bank, other parties involved in the SPV and,
perhaps, the owners of the FLP.
4 Risk-Return Characteristics of the Underly-
ing Portfolios
We now analyse the risk-return characteristics of the portfolios underlying mez-
zanine securitisations. This helps to answer the question why it is possible for
SPVs to charge much lower interest rates in middle market transaction-loans as
compared to other mezzanine loans.
4.1 Some Portfolio Data
Oﬀering circulars and Moody’s New Issue respectively Pre-Sale reports about the
transactions contain information about volumes of the mezzanine loans, obligor
ratings in the underlying portfolios as well as the weighted average coupons.
Based on this information, we derive some rough measures to evaluate the un-
derlying portfolio. The ﬁrst measure is the present value of the portfolio using a
standard bond valuation model. The second measure estimates the annual proﬁt
margin a bank would earn on buying the portfolio at par value.
The present values of the portfolios at the issuance date of each transaction
are calculated assuming that each loan has a bullet maturity of 7 years and is
charged the weighted average interest coupon. Since the securitisation of loans
causes transaction costs, these costs are subtracted from the annual contractual
payments. The assumed annual transaction costs are depicted in Table 3, based
on information given in some oﬀering circulars.8 To account for the risk, the net
payments are discounted at the risk-free rate plus the credit spread of comparable
8The present analysis does not distinguish between senior and subordinated expenses. In-
stead the sum of those two is taken for the calculations.
9corporate bonds. In particular, the risk-free rate is assumed to equal the index
value of the iBoxx e Eurozone 5-7 years (Sovereign Index) at the issue date of
each transaction. As a credit spread, we take the spread of the iBoxx Corporate
BBB 5-7 years index. This index contains mainly senior bonds with an average
rating of BBB.9 In contrast the portfolios considered here contain only subordi-
nated instruments with a higher loss given default and a lower average rating of
BBB-. To account for the higher expected loss, we take twice the correspond-
ing iBoxx spread at the issue date for discounting.10 The doubled spread ranges
between 130 and 170 basispoints.
The results are shown in Table 3. As can be seen, the present values at
issuance clearly exceed the nominal value by 7% up to 13%. This means that the
interest paid by the obligors more than compensates for the risk of the mezzanine
loans provided that our spread assumptions are correct. The excess value is
presumably to a large part due to liquidity premia incorporated in the interest
rates charged on the loans. In fact this surplus is earned by the originating parties
when securitising the loan portfolios and issuing bonds amounting to 100% of the
nominal value. It is extracted from the transaction partly by swap rents and
partly by the right to withdraw excess spread, i.e. the annual diﬀerence between
interest income paid by obligors and interest expense paid on issued bonds net
of transaction costs.
In order to study the costs and the corresponding proﬁt margins of the un-
derlying portfolios in more detail, we next take the view of a bank evaluating
such a portfolio. In particular, the expected annual costs, which have to be cov-
ered by the portfolio interest rate, i.e. the weighted average loan interest rate,
are composed of the weighted average expected annualized default loss, a default
risk premium, perhaps a liquidity premium, the transaction costs of securitisation
and the funding costs of buying the portfolio. An annual proﬁt margin deﬁned as
the portfolio interest rate minus the expected annualized default loss, minus the
transaction costs and minus the funding costs can be derived for each transac-
tion. This proﬁt margin should cover the default risk premium and the liquidity
premium.
The expected annualized default loss can be inferred from the information on
the obligor ratings. For each obligor we use the initial rating stated in the oﬀering
circular and derive the probability of default according to the idealized table of
Standard & Poor’s. This table assigns to each rating and each maturity a proba-
bility of default. Dividing this probability by the maturity yields the annualized
default probabilities. These are weighted with the volumes of the loans to obtain
the weighted annualized default probability. Since MEs might exhibit higher de-
fault probabilities than given in these tables, we stress our results by repeating
9The iBoxx index does not diﬀerentiate for notches within one rating class.
10According to Standard & Poor’s (2005) a bond rated BBB- exhibits a default probability
roughly twice as high as a bond rated BBB given a maturity of 7 years. Together with a high
loss given default this justiﬁes doubling the iBoxx spread.
10Table 3: This table presents the present values of the portfolios underlying the ten mezzanine transactions. The ﬁrst column
denotes the transaction. The second column shows the risk-free rate, assumed to equal the iBoxx e Eurozone 5-7 years at the issue
date of each transaction. Then the weighted average coupon taken from the oﬀering circular is given. The next two columns depict
the assumptions about the annual transaction costs, split into senior and subordinate expenses, based on the oﬀering circulars. If
such information is not available, it is assumed that the costs are equal to those of similar transactions. Set-up costs are irrelevant
since they are charged separately to the obligors. (Exception: In FORCE 2005-1 the originator has a super-senior claim of 150
bps in the ﬁrst period to cover set-up costs.) The sixth column depicts the present value at the issuance date, which is derived by
discounting the contractual cashﬂows minus transaction costs at the risk-free rate plus twice the iBoxx Corporate BBB 5-7 years
credit spread at the issuance date. The last column denotes the present value in percent of the initial nominal value.
Transaction Risk-free Average Transaction Costs PV at issuance Percentage of
Rate Coupon Senior Exp. Subord. Exp. (in million e) Nominal Value
(bps) (bps)
PREPS 2004-1 3.75% 7.90% 30 50 273.14 109.70%
PREPS 2004-2 3.15% 7.50% 30 50 693.90 112.65%
PREPS 2005-1 2.90% 6.80% 50 50 342.84 109.53%
H.E.A.T. I 2005 2.90% 7.40% 50 50 248.84 113.11%
PREPS 2005-2 3.15% 6.91% 40 65 387.63 107.68%
FORCE 2005-1 3.15% 7.90% 40 60 416.40 112.39%
CB MezzCAP 3.80% 7.74% 50 50 217.15 108.85%
H.E.A.T. II 2006 3.80% 7.96% 40 60 308.36 110.13%
StaGe Mezzanine 3.90% 8.14% 30 65 191.63 109.00%
PREPS 2006-1 3.90% 7.78% 30 65 343.42 106.98%
1
1the calculations assuming an initial rating two notches below the original rating
(notching approach). The annualized expected default loss is then calculated by
assuming a loss given default of 80%, i.e. a recovery rate of 20%, which accounts
for the highly subordinated character of the underlying mezzanine loans and the
fact that there is no collateral for these loans. Alternatively, a recovery rate of
even 0 is assumed to stress also this assumption. In fact the rating agencies also
use recovery rates close to 0 (see Standard & Poor’s 2005 or Moody’s New Issue
Reports). Acharya et al (2007) ﬁnd recovery rates on junior subordinated claims
with an average of 18.28% and a median of 6.25%. Concerning the transaction
costs we take the same assumptions as in Table 3. The funding costs are assumed
to equal the risk-free rate plus a spread of 30 basispoints. This spread is slightly
above the mean spread of the iBoxx e Corporates AA 5-7 years.
The derived expected annualized default loss and transaction costs plus fund-
ing costs are subsequently subtracted from the portfolio interest rate to derive
the annual proﬁt margin of the portfolio. The corresponding results for all ten
middle market transactions are shown in Table 4.
As Table 4 shows, the annual proﬁt margins are quite high, using the original
obligor ratings. In fact, they are far above comparable corporate bond spreads.
As noted before, the spread of the iBoxx Corporate BBB 5-7 years index ranges
between 65 and 85 basispoints. Doubling this spread yields 130 and 170 basis-
points. The proﬁt margins are always higher except for some transactions in the
case of assuming an initial rating two notches below the original rating.
Interestingly, the change from a recovery rate of 20% to 0% has only a small
eﬀect since the average probability of default is low. Given, for example, an
annual default probability of 0.69% for the PREPS 2004-1 transaction (fourth
column in Table 4), an increase of the recovery rate from 0 to 20% reduces the
expected loss only by 0.69% ∗ 0.2 = 0.138% to 0.552%. The picture changes when
the original obligor ratings are downgraded by two notches. Then the average
portfolio rating is around BB+/BB- and the annual proﬁt margin declines by
about 60% and more. Hence a rating error has much more serious implications
than an error in estimating the recovery rate.
Returning to the question why mezzanine loans are so much cheaper in securi-
tisation transactions than otherwise, the previous results indicate that originating
banks still earned a substantial proﬁt. However, the picture looks diﬀerent in view
of the doubling of many credits spreads in the subprime crisis. Relative to these
spreads, some mezzanine loans maybe underpriced in securitisation transactions.
4.2 Simulation of Portfolio Cashﬂows
The previous results provide a ﬁrst guess about the portfolio characteristics, ig-
noring diversiﬁcation eﬀects as well as eﬀects of timing of default. In the follow-
ing we therefore simulate the portfolio cashﬂows taking these eﬀects into account.
The cashﬂow simulation model is explicitly described in appendix C. Basically, we
12Table 4: The table provides ﬁgures on the annual proﬁt margin of portfolios underlying middle market transactions, deﬁned as
the weighted average loan interest rate minus the expected annualized default loss and the transaction costs. The ﬁrst column
denotes the transaction. The next columns depict the expected annualized default loss and the annualized proﬁt margin assuming
a recovery rate (RR) of 20% resp. 0%. The last columns illustrate the results for the notched ratings, starting two notches below
the original rating.
Transaction original obligor ratings notched obligor ratings
20% Recovery 0% Recovery 20% Recovery 0% Recovery
Exp. Proﬁt Exp. Proﬁt Exp. Proﬁt Exp. Proﬁt
Loss margin Loss margin Loss margin Loss margin
PREPS 2004-1 0.552% 2.498% 0.690% 2.360% 1.160% 1.890% 1.450% 1.600%
PREPS 2004-2 0.482% 2.768% 0.602% 2.648% 1.033% 2.217% 1.291% 1.959%
PREPS 2005-1 0.478% 2.122% 0.598% 2.002% 1.056% 1.544% 1.319% 1.281%
H.E.A.T. I 2005 0.421% 2.779% 0.527% 2.673% 0.956% 2.244% 1.195% 2.005%
PREPS 2005-2 0.478% 1.927% 0.598% 1.807% 1.057% 1.348% 1.321% 1.084%
FORCE 2005-1 0.396% 2.840% 0.495% 2.741% 0.897% 2.338% 1.122% 2.114%
CB MezzCAP 0.483% 2.157% 0.604% 2.036% 1.094% 1.546% 1.368% 1.272%
H.E.A.T. II 2006 0.457% 2.406% 0.571% 2.292% 0.994% 1.869% 1.242% 1.621%
StaGe Mezzanine 0.597% 2.393% 0.746% 2.244% 1.300% 1.690% 1.625% 1.365%
PREPS 2006-1 0.544% 2.089% 0.680% 1.953% 1.146% 1.488% 1.432% 1.201%
Source: Own calculations and assumptions based on information in the Oﬀering Circulars.
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3model annual rating migrations of the loans in the underlying portfolio. Again, a
recovery rate of 20% is assumed in the base case in order to account for the highly
subordinated character of the mezzanine loans. This assumption is stressed by
assuming a recovery rate of 0% in an alternative simulation. Thus we derive an-
nual cashﬂows from the underlying portfolio and compound them to the maturity
date after seven years.
Up to now, there exist no reliable data of rating transitions in the ME sector.
In order to account for possibly higher default rates of MEs, a notching approach
is again used as it is also done by the rating agencies (e.g. Standard & Poor’s
2006). In particular, the simulation results derived from the original ratings are
stressed by repeating the simulation starting from a rating two notches lower
than the original rating. For example, a claim with an original rating of BBB
starts with BB+ in the second simulation. This notching approach should also
- at least partially - account for possible interest deferral and loss participation,
which have a similar impact on the value of a claim as an increase in the default
probability.11 The corresponding weighted average annualized default probabil-
ities are also shown in Table 4 since for a recovery rate of 0%, that is a loss
given default of 100%, the annualized expected loss equals the annualized default
probability.
Given the simulated realised cashﬂows of each simulation run the total port-
folio loss rate at the termination date is subsequently calculated as




Thus the Terminal Loss Rate Distribution of the underlying portfolio is derived
by simulation.
The simulated terminal loss rate distributions of the portfolio underlying
PREPS 2005-2 for diﬀerent model speciﬁcations are illustrated in Figure 1. As
can be seen, again the eﬀect of increasing the recovery rate from 0% to 20% is
much smaller than the eﬀect of increasing the default probability by starting two
notches below the original rating.
Table 5 presents some descriptive statistics of the simulated loss rate distri-
butions for the original as well as the notched rating approach given a recovery
rate of 20%. Whereas the expected terminal loss rate is between 2.5% and 3.5%
starting with the original obligor ratings12 (given the time horizon of seven years),
it more than doubles when departing from two rating notches below. Also the
standard deviation is substantially increased. Additionally, the table gives the
99%-quantile of the loss rate distribution.
It should be noted once more, that the model does not explicitly account for
the typical mezzanine characteristics of the portfolio claims such as proﬁt-related
11Ratings given in the oﬀering circulars are company ratings and not claim speciﬁc.
12These ﬁgures diﬀer from those in Table 4 because the simulation also includes interest.
14Figure 1: The Figure illustrates the Terminal Loss Rate distribution of the portfolio
underlying PREPS 2005-2. Diﬀerent simulation speciﬁcations are considered: The ﬁrst
simulation takes the original ratings as a departure point and assumes a recovery rate
of 20%. Alternatively, the second simulation uses ratings two notches below the original
ones as a starting point. The same simulations are repeated for a recovery rate of 0%.
Table 5: This table presents some descriptive statistics concerning the Terminal Loss
Rate Distribution of the underlying portfolio. These are the expected terminal loss
rate over seven years, the corresponding standard deviation as well as the loss rate at
the 99%-quantile. Columns 2 to 4 depict the results starting from the original obligor
ratings and assuming a recovery rate of 20%. The last three columns present the same
statistics starting from an initial rating two notches below the original rating.
Transaction original obligor ratings notched obligor ratings
Exp. Std. 99% Exp. Std. 99%
Loss Rate Dev. Quantile Loss Rate Dev. Quantile
PREPS 2004-1 3.226% 2.853% 11.605% 7.034% 4.272% 18.932%
PREPS 2004-2 2.839% 2.012% 8.823% 6.282% 3.072% 14.726%
PREPS 2005-1 2.857% 2.304% 9.738% 6.488% 3.579% 16.422%
H.E.A.T. I 2005 2.506% 2.526% 10.455% 5.858% 4.012% 17.651%
PREPS 2005-2 2.862% 2.214% 9.364% 6.505% 3.421% 15.848%
FORCE 2005-1 2.294% 1.905% 8.341% 5.416% 3.013% 13.766%
CB MezzCAP 2.801% 2.586% 10.726% 6.587% 4.157% 18.523%
H.E.A.T. II 2006 2.666% 2.278% 9.440% 5.991% 3.489% 15.405%
StaGe Mezzanine 3.510% 2.497% 10.735% 7.815% 3.880% 18.723%
PREPS 2006-1 3.172% 2.305% 9.940% 6.889% 3.483% 16.332%
15Figure 2: The Figure illustrates the relation between the volume of the junior notes
in percent of the transaction volume and the 99%-quantile of the terminal loss rate
distribution starting from the original ratings and assuming a 20% recovery rate.
interest components, interest deferrals, deferral surcharges and loss participa-
tions. The notching approach accounts for the value impairing characteristics
excluding the value enhancing characteristics. These may be captured, to some
extent, by the assumed higher recovery rate of 20%.
5 Analysing Tranching
Having analysed the risk-return characteristics of the underlying portfolios, we
now turn to the tranching of the middle market transactions. Most of the trans-
actions have two rated tranches (AAA and A+/A) and one non-rated junior
note. In contrast, in PREPS 2004-1 only one rated tranche (AA), in FORCE
2005-1 four rated tranches (AAA, AA, A, BBB) and in CB MezzCap even ﬁve
rated tranches (AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB) are issued. Table 6 presents the sizes
of the best tranche as well as the junior note size deﬁned by the par value of the
tranche over the total transaction volume. The best tranche is smallest for those
transactions with more than two rated tranches and highest for PREPS 2004-1
with only one rated tranche. The hard credit support (i.e. the portfolio loss rate
above which a tranche incurs losses) for the best tranche varies between 11% and
36%.
The size of the junior note depends on the properties of the loss rate distri-
16Table 6: This table presents some facts on the tranching of middle market trans-
actions. In the second column the size of the super-senior tranche deﬁned as the par
value of the tranche relative to the par value of the transaction is depicted. The third
column shows the size of the Junior Notes. Column 3 gives the Junior Note Coupon.
This Coupon increases for the PREPS and H.E.A.T. transactions. The ﬁrst (last)
number denotes the initial (ﬁnal) interest rate. In column 4 the proﬁt participation of
the junior note holders is given, if such exists. This can be a terminal repayment agio
(RA, in percent of the initial par value) or an annual share in the proﬁts (PS) after the
Junior Coupon is paid (in percent of the remaining surplus).
Transaction Super Junior Junior Note Add. Proﬁt
Senior Note Coupon Participation
PREPS 2004-1 88.35% 11.65% 22% -
PREPS 2004-2 75.94% 10.07% 18.10% to 19.71% RA: 36%
PREPS 2005-1 75.08% 9.90% 17.00% to 18.34% RA: 43%
H.E.A.T. I 2005 71.55% 12.96% 17.15% to 19.10% RA: 25%
PREPS 2005-2 75.00% 10.00% 14.50% to 16.26% PS: 100%
FORCE 2005-1 63.70% 21.00% 20.19% resp. 19.14% -
CB MezzCAP 69.07% 4.51% 17.00% PS: 99.9%
H.E.A.T. II 2006 78.00% 11.00% 17.15% to 19.10% RA: 25%
StaGe Mezzanine 75.54% 13.08% 23.9% PS: 49.95%
PREPS 2006-1 74.46% 10.28% 14.50% to 16.67% PS: 99.99%
Source: Oﬀering Circulars.
bution and the lowest rating of the notes above the junior note. A ﬁrst rough
guess shows that the size of the junior note is, on average, slightly above the
99%-quantile of the loss rate distribution, given the original rating and a 20 per-
cent recovery rate. This is also illustrated in Figure 2. The striking exceptions
are FORCE 2005-1 and CB Mess CAP. Not surprising, in the latter transaction
the lowest rating of the note above the junior tranche is BB allowing for a small
junior tranche. Puzzling is that in FORCE 2005-1 with the lowest tranche rating
being BBB the junior tranche is much higher (21 percent) than the 99%-quantile
of the loss rate distribution given the notched rating and a 20 percent recovery
rate (13,8 percent). Perhaps risk factors, not publicly known, matter.
5.1 Modelling the Tranche Payments
We determine tranche payments at annual payment dates by applying the typi-
cal “CDO-waterfall” as described in appendix C. Thereby we account for several
peculiarities of middle market transaction. In particular, it is a special feature
of middle market transactions that the junior note, which is often (at least par-
tially) sold to outside investors, bears a Junior Note Coupon which is explicitly
17stated in the oﬀering circulars and which is paid after all expenses and interest
payments to rated tranches. For example, in the PREPS and H.E.A.T. transac-
tions the junior note gets a steadily increasing coupon according to a speciﬁed
schedule given in the oﬀering circular. The initial and the ﬁnal coupons of these
schedules are depicted in Table 6 together with the junior note coupons in the
other transactions.13
Concerning the excess cashﬂow after paying this junior note coupon, that is
after paying all expenses and all interest claims, we have to diﬀerentiate between
the analysed transactions. In CB MezzCap and StaGe Mezzanine the excess
cashﬂow is ﬁrst used to replenish a reserve account up to a speciﬁed cap.14 In
all other transactions, there is no reserve account. Instead the remaining excess
spread is directly paid out to the general and limited partners of the SPV. In
some transactions this surplus is also shared with the junior note as additional
interest. The corresponding junior note participation rates (in percent of the
remaining surplus), are presented in column 5 of Table 6 (indicated by PS). In
fact this remaining part of the portfolio cashﬂow can be a substantial amount. If
no losses in the underlying portfolio occur, that is in the best case, this surplus
accounts for 6% up to 8% of the transaction volume in most of the transactions.
At maturity, a further peculiarity of middle market transactions concerning
the junior note needs to be taken into consideration. In some structures the
repayment amount of this non-rated tranche after seven years is raised by an
agio deﬁned as a percentage of the par value of the junior note. As shown in
column 5 of Table 6, in those transactions with repayment agios (indicated by
RA), the repayment amount exceeds the initial nominal value by 25% up to 43%.
This agio can also be interpreted as an additional proﬁt participation.
Based on these assumptions we can derive the accumulated tranche losses at
maturity in each simulation run by comparing the received payments with the
contractual payments. Hence, the payoﬀ proﬁles and risk characteristics for each
tranche including the junior note are determined.
5.2 Simulated Junior Note Characteristics
As mentioned before, part or all of the junior tranche in a middle market trans-
action is sold to outside investors. Therefore, we ask whether this tranche is a
proﬁtable investment. To answer this question, some payoﬀ characteristics of the
junior note are derived based on the simulations. The key ﬁgures describing the
junior note of each transaction are presented in Table 7 and 8 for four simulation
scenarios. The base case is again deﬁned by the original obligor rating and a
13In FORCE 2005-1 20.188% p.a. are paid for the ﬁrst 18 months followed by 19.138% p.a.
Regarding StaGe Mezzanine the Junior Note gets EURIBOR + 20%. For the simulation a
constant risk-free rate at 3.9% is assumed.
14E.g. 4 million e in CB MezzCap resp. 5% of the outstanding volume of rated tranches in
StaGe Mezzanine.
18recovery rate of 20%. In order to test for the robustness of our results these
assumptions are stressed by reducing the recovery rate to 0% and/or reducing
the obligor ratings by two notches. Altogether four scenarios are studied.
(a) The Expected Internal Rate of Return
First, an investor may be interested in the expected internal rate of return (IRR),





! = PriceIssue Date
where T = 7. In general, the junior tranche is issued at par.15
In the simulations, which start from the original obligor ratings and a recov-
ery rate of 20%, the junior notes exhibit high expected internal rates of return
between 15% and 25% (Table 7). Assuming a recovery rate of 0%, the expected
IRRs are only slighty reduced. The highest possible internal rates of return range
between 17% and 29% (last column of Table 7).16 These results are due to a high
excess spread, that is a high interest diﬀerential between the asset and the liabil-
ity side of the transactions, which is around 3%. In fact, the portfolio companies
pay interest much higher than the interest paid on the tranches. Even after ac-
counting for transaction costs of around 1%, this high margin is enough to cover
a large part of default losses and to pay high interest to the junior tranche and
sometimes even an additional performance premium.
The simulated returns depend on the assumptions concerning the portfolio
performance. As noted before, it might be too optimistic to start with the original
ratings in the simulation. Therefore the results given the notching approach, in
which the portfolios’ default probabilities are approximately doubled, are also
shown in Table 7. But even in this stressed scenario the expected internal rate
of return on the junior note is still above 10% for a recovery rate of 20%. If,
however, the recovery rate is reduced to 0%, then the expected internal rate of
return is below 10% for half the transactions.
(b) The Sharpe Ratio
In order to relate the expected IRR of the junior note to its risk, the Sharpe
Ratio given by
Sharpe Ratio =
Exp. IRR − riskfree rate
annualized standard deviation
,
is also depicted in Table 7. Given the original ratings and a recovery rate of 20
percent, all transactions except CBMezzCAP have a Sharpe Ratio above 2, with a
15One exception is FORCE 2005-1. In this transaction, the issue price of the junior note is
actually 101.17%. Therefore the IRR is calculated based on this issue price.
16For the PREPS 2004-2 transaction, J.P. Morgan Securities Ltd. (2004) arrives at similar
results in their presentation for potential investors.
19Table 7: The table presents some return characteristics of the Junior Notes for diﬀerent simulation speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst
column denotes the transaction. The next four columns depict the results departing from the original obligor ratings and assuming
a recovery rate (RR) of 20% resp. 0%. For each speciﬁcation, the expected internal rate of return and the Sharpe Ratio is presented.
Columns 6 to 9 illustrate the results for the notched ratings, starting two notches below the original rating. The last column shows
the maximum possible internal rate of return. This ﬁgure is the same for all speciﬁcations. Only the probability of this return
changes.
Transaction original obligor ratings notched obligor ratings
20% Recovery 0% Recovery 20% Recovery 0% Recovery
Exp. Sharpe Exp. Sharpe Exp. Sharpe Exp. Sharpe Max
IRR Ratio IRR Ratio IRR Ratio IRR Ratio IRR
PREPS 2004-1 16.15% 2.00 14.88% 1.32 10.98% 0.70 7.61% 0.27 19.76%
PREPS 2004-2 16.90% 3.06 15.96% 2.11 12.57% 1.22 9.63% 0.59 19.91%
PREPS 2005-1 15.19% 2.24 14.02% 1.46 10.32% 0.79 6.76% 0.27 18.39%
H.E.A.T. I 2005 16.51% 3.06 15.74% 2.09 13.22% 1.29 10.90% 0.69 18.63%
PREPS 2005-2 23.25% 4.09 22.54% 3.25 17.94% 1.78 16.40% 1.45 26.68%
FORCE 2005-1 15.83% 5.00 15.51% 4.00 13.38% 2.26 12.50% 1.66 17.43%
CB MezzCAP 17.15% 1.68 15.42% 1.06 10.37% 0.46 5.83% 0.10 20.00%
H.E.A.T. II 2006 16.12% 2.58 15.16% 1.71 12.13% 1.00 9.24% 0.44 18.82%
StaGe Mezzanine 22.09% 4.21 21.35% 3.22 16.98% 1.61 14.96% 1.12 25.01%
PREPS 2006-1 24.95% 4.26 24.18% 3.40 19.53% 1.93 17.95% 1.59 28.71%
2
0maximum of 5 for FORCE 2005-1. A Sharpe Ratio higher than 2 clearly indicates
a proﬁtable investment. Comparable investments, like investing in a diversiﬁed
equity index (SDAX or TecDAX) exhibit Sharpe Ratios below 1, Private Equity
Funds usually exhibit Sharpe Ratios below 2.17 Even for the notching approach
and a high recovery rate most Sharpe Ratios stay above 1, which is still attractive
to outside investors. But for the notching approach and a zero recovery rate, the
Sharpe Ratio is very low in three transactions.
(c) The Downside Risk
Since the return distributions are skewed to the left, the downside risk of the
junior note is important for the value at risk. To illustrate this risk, (1) the
probability that the terminal payoﬀ is less than the payoﬀ which could be gener-
ated by investing at the risk-free rate, and (2) the internal rate of return at the
1%-quantile are presented in Table 8.
The downside risk is very low starting from the original ratings. In most of
the transactions, the probability to get less than the risk-free rate on the initial
investment is less than three percent and therefore almost negligible. For the
original obligor ratings and a recovery rate of 20 percent, the internal rates of
return at the one percent quantile are always positive (except for CB MezzCap)
indicating that an investor does not lose money. The exception is explained by
the very small size of the junior note. Although the downside risk substantially
increases using the more conservative notching approach, downside risk remains
low as compared to other investments. In three transactions the probability to
earn less than the risk-free rate is still less than 3 percent, regardless of the
assumed recovery rate. However, given the notching and a zero recovery rate,
the 1%-quantile-IRR indicates a loss of more than 50 percent of the investment
in 7 transactions. Apart from CB MezzCap with a very small junior note, among
the other 6 transactions are those with a small number of loans implying little
diversiﬁcation. This demonstrates the strong impact of size and diversiﬁcation on
the risk of the junior tranche. Small size and low diversiﬁcation not only imply a
strong risk for the junior note, but also a high probability that the rated tranches
suﬀer default losses.
To sum up, the simulation results support the view that an investment in the
junior note of the analysed mezzanine transactions is mostly attractive for outside
investors. Even in the scenario where the original ratings are stressed by two
notches this position mostly exhibits quite favourable risk-return characteristics
as long as the recovery rate is at 20%. The favorable risk-return characteristics of
junior notes are presumably induced by the fact that junior notes are partly sold
to other banks. These have to support the investment in junior notes with high
equity capital which is considered costly. According to the Basel II banks have
17For example, the Oppenheim Private Equity Fonds or Deka Private Equity Fonds usually
exhibit Sharpe Ratios around 1.8 (see www.boerse-online.de).
21Table 8: The table presents some ﬁgures describing the downside risk of the Junior Notes in diﬀerent scenarios. First the
probability that the terminal payoﬀ (TP) is less than the payoﬀ which could be generated by investing in the risk-free rate (RF)
is shown. Second, the internal rate of return, which corresponds to the 1%-Quantil of the terminal payoﬀ distribution, is given.
Transaction original ratings notched ratings
20% Recovery 0% Recovery 20% Recovery 0% Recovery
Prob 1% Prob 1% Prob 1% Prob 1%
(TP < RF) IRR (TP < RF) IRR (TP < RF) IRR (TP < RF) IRR
PREPS 2004-1 2.85% 0.68% 8.65% -10.14% 23.48% -13.61% 41.02% -47.96%
PREPS 2004-2 0.21% 7.13% 2.11% 0.51% 6.93% -2.16% 25.49% -20.07%
PREPS 2005-1 1.41% 1.65% 5.83% -5.69% 19.58% -8.85% 39.07% -49.04%
H.E.A.T. I 2005 0.55% 6.18% 2.41% -1.31% 7.98% -5.22% 20.73% -34.02%
PREPS 2005-2 0.02% 11.29% 0.03% 8.74% 1.30% 2.86% 2.24% 1.97%
FORCE 2005-1 0.00% 10.71% 0.03% 9.03% 0.58% 4.68% 2.53% 0.56%
CB MezzCAP 5.79% -8.26% 14.24% -22.92% 31.77% -30.14% 53.04% -30.14%
H.E.A.T. II 2006 0.75% 5.19% 3.73% -2.97% 12.89% -5.23% 30.23% -23.11%
StaGe Mezzanine 0.12% 12.39% 0.42% 7.36% 5.45% -1.24% 11.86% -9.61%
PREPS 2006-1 0.02% 13.30% 0.03% 10.38% 1.11% 3.93% 1.80% 2.87%
2
2to deduct the volume of the junior note from their equity capital (see Bank for
International Settlements 2005). Hence banks are unlikely to buy junior notes
with low expected IRRs.
Furthermore, it should be noted that so far observed default rates in SME
pools are quite low (see J.P. Morgan 2006). Additionally, one has to bear in mind
the reputational costs for the originating banks in case of bad portfolio perfor-
mance. This might explain why Commerzbank repurchased the NICI exposure
from the CB MezzCap transaction after NICI’s insolvency. Thereby a downgrade
of the transaction was avoided (see FINANCE 2006a).
6 Conclusion
This paper analyses mezzanine transactions, which represent a new trend in the
German securitisation market.
The ﬁndings indicate that these transactions are attractive to originators and
investors. The estimated present values of these transactions indicate a sizable
“arbitrage proﬁt” for the originators. Securitisations are also attractive for origi-
nating banks, because they often earn fees for administering the transaction and
may beneﬁt from swaps with the SPV. Additionally, they get part of the prof-
its earned by the SPV. Regarding the junior tranches, even under pessimistic
assumptions and ignoring proﬁt participations, they mostly yield high expected
internal rates of return at low downside risk. This indicates a strong desire of the
originators to sell part of the junior notes to outside investors, including banks.
Given bank equity costs, the return needs to be high to render the junior note
an attractive investment for banks.
Also MEs gain from middle market securitisations because these transactions
fuel the supply of mezzanine loans and stimulate the competitive pressure in
the market for these instruments. This may also explain why the interest rates
charged on these loans are relatively low. Mezzanine loans can strengthen (eco-
nomic) equity and thus increase MEs’ creditworthiness. But a stringent screening
process has to be passed to get into the pool of such a transaction. Looking at
statistics concerning current portfolio companies, for example in PREPS 2004-2,
only 15% of the enterprises reported an annual turnover of less than 50 million
e, 20% were even above 300 million e (see JPMorgan 2004). Furthermore, only
about 39% of all obligors in the FORCE 2005-1 portfolio employed less than 400
employees, but 21% more than 1000. Hence, the portfolios consist not only of
MEs but also of large enterprises.
Middle market securitisations will presumably grow further. Up to July 2006,
only 432 diﬀerent obligors, 396 German enterprises and 36 from other European
countries, joined one or more of the current transactions (see FINANCE 2006).
Therefore, a large pool of companies is still in the pipeline. Whether the subprime
crisis puts a strong brake on these transactions, needs to be seen. The strong
23increase in credit spreads will induce higher interest rates on mezzanine loans
and, thus, reduce MEs’ appetite for these loans. More importantly, to foster
ﬁnancial stability, these transactions should include a higher number of loans so
as to improve diversiﬁcation. Also, the junior tranches should absorb a large
fraction of default losses and the originator should retain a substantial portion of
the junior tranche to improve investor conﬁdence.
24Appendix
A Mezzanine Instruments underlying FORCE 2005-1
The oﬀering circular of FORCE 2005-1 generally allows for three diﬀerent types
of underlying instruments, called equiNotes, which will be presented in the
following:18
• equiNotes Type A (Proﬁt Participation Agreements, Genussrechte)
These notes build the main part of the portfolio and pay a ﬁxed inter-
est coupon except if one of the following conditions for interest deferral is
fulﬁlled:
(i) no annual surplus according to §266 HGB
(ii) no balance sheet proﬁt according to §268 HGB in the relevant ﬁscal
year or
(iii) no distributable reserves available.
In case of interest deferral, the cumulative interest payments plus a sur-
charge due to payment pattern are due at the next payment date at which
the company reports a proﬁt or has distributable reserves available. If there
are deferred interest payments left after the ﬁrst seven years, the maturity
of the claim can be extended up to 29 years. Furthermore Type A equiNotes
allow for loss participation if there are no distributable reserves left. But
even in case of loss participation the interest stays payable and the notional
amount has to be reﬁlled in the subsequent years if there are any proﬁts.
• equiNotes Type A* (Subordinated Loans)
In contrast to Type A, these notes pay a ﬁxed coupon, independent of
obligors’ proﬁts, and an additional, but very small, variable component
(0.25%) for which the same conditions hold as for the Type A interest.
Interest deferral and loss participation are excluded. Therefore equiNotes
Type A* are not recognized as equity under the German accounting rules
in contrast to the Type A equiNotes.
• equiNotes Type B (perpetual PPAs, Vorzugskapital)
These notes exhibit no ﬁnal maturity but are callable by the obligor at any
date after seven years. Therefore they are recognized as equity even under
IAS. For the ﬁrst seven years these claims pay a ﬁxed coupon, afterwards
a variable coupon is paid with the possibility of interest deferral.
For all types of equiNotes, the ME has to pay a surcharge if it does not provide
the annual ﬁnancial statement and quarterly reports in time.
18Actually, the portfolio contains only two Type A* and one Type B equiNotes.
25B Transaction Scheme
Figure 3: Simpliﬁed Scheme of a Middle Market Transaction
C Simulation Model
Modelling the Underlying Portfolio
For the analysis in this paper we use the same simulation model as in Hein (2007).
This model resembles the Standard & Poor’s CDO Evaluator and is similar to
the simulation model used in Franke/Krahnen (2007). Given the bullet maturity
of seven years for each loan, rating migrations of the loans in the underlying
portfolio are simulated for each year starting with the initial obligor ratings.19 For
simpliﬁcation annual payments are assumed. For each loan a normally distributed
random number is drawn at each annual payment date. This number determines
the one-year rating migration of the loan by comparing it to the threshold values
of a normal distribution derived from the one-year transition matrix of Standard
& Poor’s. If the new rating of a claim stays above D, the full interest is paid at
the next payment date. If the rating of a claim moves to D, default occurs. In this
19This approach of simulating rating transitions diﬀers from the approach of using factor mod-
els, which is also widely used in the literature on securitisation. E.g. Hull/White (2004), Gibson
(2004) and Weber (2007) use a one-factor model to model loan defaults. Duﬃe/Garleanu (2001)
and Longstaﬀ/Rajan (2007) even apply multi-factor models in their analysis.
26case a recovery amount is paid immediately and there are no further payments
on this loan.
The portfolio loss rate strongly depends on default correlations. In fact, rating
migrations of obligors are assumed to be correlated. Particularly, for two obligors
within the same industry the asset migrations are assumed to be correlated with
0.1, for two obligors from diﬀerent industries the correlation is assumed to be
0.04. These are the assumptions made also in the CDO Evaluator by S&P (see
Standard & Poor’s 2005). The levels of these asset migration correlations are
controversial as are the binary default correlations. The higher these correlations
are, the wider is the dispersion of the loss rate distribution. The asset migration
correlations are accounted for in the simulation by multiplying the vector of
uncorrelated normal random numbers with the Cholesky decomposition of the
correlation matrix.
Based on these assumptions, the portfolio cashﬂows at annual payment dates
are simulated. These cashﬂows are composed of the interest payments of those
loans, which do not default until this date, plus the recovery payments of loans
defaulted at this date. Since there is no information about loan speciﬁc interest
coupons available, it is again assumed that each loan pays the average ﬁxed
interest coupon stated in the reports (see Table 3). At ﬁnal maturity (after seven
years) the portfolio cashﬂows also include the repayments of all non-defaulted
claims. All payments are compounded to the termination date at the assumed
funding cost.
In each simulation run the total portfolio loss rate at the termination date is
then calculated as




The accumulated contractual payments equal the accumulated received payments
in case of no default.
Modelling the Tranche Payments
As for the portfolio, we also model the tranche payments explicitly with the
simulation model. In particular, the simulated portfolio cashﬂows and losses
are allocated to the diﬀerent tranches at annual payment dates according to
the payment structure described in the oﬀering circulars. All transactions use a
‘single waterfall’ structure, i.e. not diﬀerentiating between principal and interest
losses respectively payments. In fact, two allocations take place at the same time:
(1) the allocation of default losses and (2) the allocation of cashﬂows.
Default losses (interest and principal losses) are allocated to principal as well
as interest claims from the bottom to the top of the structure.20 First, the reserve
20For a discussion of diﬀerent loss allocation rules see Hein (2007).
27account (if it exists) is reduced by the total period loss. The remaining loss is
subsequently allocated to the excess spread of the current period, then to the
interest claim of the junior tranche, then to the principal of the junior note, then
to the principal of the lowest rated tranche, then to the interest claim of the
lowest rated tranche and so on. If the principal of a tranche is reduced, then also
its future interest claims are reduced pari passu.
The portfolio cashﬂows are allocated as follows. First, the incoming payments
are used to cover senior expenses. Together with the subordinate expenses these
expenses should cover all servicing, rating and administration fees as well as
trustee expenses.21
The senior expenses rank senior to the interest payments on the rated tranches,
which are paid next from the remaining cashﬂow starting with the most senior
tranche. In order to determine the exact payments, we derive the contractual
interest payments to the rated tranches assuming a constant risk-free rate and
adding the launch credit spread, which is given in the prospectus. The risk-free
rate is again assumed to equal the iBoxx e Eurozone 5-7 years at the issue date
of each transaction. Since the issue dates of the transactions diﬀer, also the as-
sumed risk-free rate for the simulation diﬀers (see Table 3). The payments to the
tranches are then given by the contractual payments adjusted for realised losses.
After the interest payment to the rated tranches, subordinate expenses are
paid. The remaining cash is then used to pay interest on the non-rated tranche.
The excess cashﬂow then is distributed as described in the oﬀering circular of the
corresponding transaction (see section 5.1).
For simpliﬁcation we do not account for the possibility of early amortisation
of tranches in case of bad portfolio performance or scheduled amortisation of
tranches. Instead bullet repayments for all tranches are assumed.22 In particular,
all incoming payments at ﬁnal maturity (accumulated recovery payments plus
loan principal repayments and interest payments for the last period) are used to
pay back tranche principal and last period’s tranche interest from the top to the
21The explicit assumptions concerning the senior and subordinated expenses are depicted in
Table 3. Except for the FORCE 2005-1 transaction, no set-up costs need to be covered by the
portfolio cashﬂows. Instead these costs, which include legal costs, rating costs, placement costs
and structuring costs, are paid by the obligors through an additional up-front fee or a disagio
between 4% and 5%. For the FORCE transaction, set-up costs of 150 bps are assumed, which
are due at the ﬁrst payment date.
22All structures make use of a Principal Deﬁciency Ledger (PDL). This means, that in case of
a default in the underlying portfolio, the senior tranche receives principal prepayments amount-
ing to the corresponding loss given default. Since in the simulation default losses are assigned
ﬁrst to the reserve account, then to the current period’s excess spread and then are allocated
to the junior tranche, the PDL-induced additional protection of the senior tranche should be
quite small.
Additionally, there exists an amortisation schedule for the super-senior tranche in all PREPS
and H.E.A.T. transactions. But the eﬀect of ignoring this feature should be negligible because
the annual amortisation amount is only between 0.25% and 0.4% of the tranche’s volume.
28bottom of the structure as long as cash is available.
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